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In February 2008 the Minister of Safety andSecurity, Charles Nqakula, announced aturnaround strategy for the criminal justice
system after an internal review showed that there
was little planning, poor implementation, and
inadequate skills in the departments responsible for
criminal justice, and little coordination between
them. A realignment of these departments under the
leadership of a ‘political champion’ (a position
similar to that of the British Home Secretary) is
envisaged to achieve greater strategic and
operational unity in the fight against crime.
Ironically, the Directorate of Specialised Operations
(the ‘Scorpions’) and the Specialised Commercial
Crime Units (SCCU), which have pioneered the
concept of integrated project-based investigations
using the skills of co-located prosecutors,
investigators and analysts and other support









When law enforcement agencies arrest abalone poachers on the Western Coast of South Africa, they may not
be aware that the drying and processing of the delicacy takes place in Gauteng and that the buyers are
organised crime networks in China. It will not be evident that the criminals use the profits (at about R1 400
per kilogram) to buy drugs for the local Southern African market.  The syndicate or loose network of crime
groups may have a distribution chain of dispensable individuals of different nationalities encompassing several
countries, specialising in particular aspects of the trade and dealing in a wide variety of illegal goods. Indeed,
the arrest of the poachers is unlikely to reveal that the profits are being used to barter for drugs and that a
large number of illegal and apparently legal companies are being used to transfer money across the globe.
Catching these kinds of transnational, cross-border, multi-ethnic and flexible criminal groups is difficult unless
law enforcement agencies have a multi-faceted strategy, use the skills of a wide range of personnel and have
the time and resources to investigate and prosecute them effectively. Traditional law enforcement is geared
towards arresting the criminal ‘runners’ rather than the ‘kingpins’. The DSO and the SCCU acquired a
reputation as the  ‘untouchables’ – units that are admired, revered and feared – and it seems unlikely that their
replacement will enjoy the same success and reputation.
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personnel, are facing closure.3 The proposed new
unit in the South African Police Service, which will
replace these structures, may not employ the same
approach or methodology. This may jeopardise
South Africa’s battle against those ‘untouchables’
involved in serious and complex organised and
financial crime and corruption. 
Organised crime and corruption in South Africa
Transnational organised crime and corruption may
be among the defining domestic and foreign policy
challenges of this century. The financial power of
organised crime groups poses a serious threat to the
South African economy and its financial system
because they undercut the prices of legitimate
businesses and undermine the integrity of financial
institutions. Furthermore, corrupt elected officials
weaken democratic institutions and deprive the
government of revenue that could be used to
provide citizens with basic needs. Financial crime
and corruption, the International Monetary Fund
estimates, may strip the economy of 0.5-1 per cent
of economic growth per annum. In 2007, 72 per
cent of South African business had fallen victim to
economic crime. Of these 38 per cent reported
corruption and bribery (Price Waterhouse Cooper
2007). South African companies lost between one
and four per cent of their sales revenue owing to
violent and other types of crime and the costs of
security (African Private Sector Group World Bank
2006).
The international and regional community of states
has taken unprecedented steps to create legal
frameworks and institutional mechanisms to combat
organised and financial crime and corruption, and
to monitor and seize illegal profits. South Africa is a
signatory to these protocols on organised crime,
corruption and related matters and has enacted
legislation to counter these forms of crime. It has
built several institutions, based on international best
practice, and at significant cost tasked them with
implementing the legislation. These include the
SAPS Organised Crime Unit, the DSO, the
Specialised Commercial Crime Units, the Special
Investigation Unit, the Financial Intelligence Centre
and the Asset Forfeiture Unit, to name a few. These
agencies form part of a multi-faceted strategy to
make the regulatory environment less welcoming,
to disrupt the activities of crime groups and to
effectively investigate and prosecute them. The
benefit of having multiple agencies is that they
provide checks and balances on the activities of the
other units in an environment where criminal groups
may attempt to penetrate these institutions to evade
detection. Yet they are able to cooperate effectively
in pursuit of the common goal of prosecuting
offenders and seizing their assets.
DSO/SCCU models of investigation and prosecution 
In South Africa, specialist units such as the DSO and
SCCU were established because it became clear that
traditional forms of investigation and prosecution
were not working in complex organised and
financial crime and corruption cases where
convictions are difficult to obtain.
The DSO has a mandate to investigate serious and
complex organised and financial crimes and
corruption. The mandate is wide in recognition of
the fact that these forms of crime evolve rapidly, the
criminal groups are highly adaptive to risk and
defence lawyers may use technical jurisdiction
issues to delay prosecutions. The model harnesses
the skills of prosecutors, analysts and investigators
along with key support personnel. Aside from the
strategy analysis team within the DSO, which
generates annual threat assessments, much emphasis
is placed on the production of tactical information
and products. These would include, for example,
detailed profiles of syndicates and their members,
cell phone calls and financial dealings. 
Using this information, investigators and forensic
experts are able to gather statements and hard
evidence that can be used to convict criminals.
From the outset of the case, prosecutors are able to
provide guidance on the prosecution strategy and
the type of information that will be necessary to
successfully prosecute on a range of charges. These
people are located together and work in project
teams. The personnel are drawn from all racial and
ethnic groups, genders and ages and have a diverse
range of graduate qualifications and skills, which
enhances their ability to conduct criminal
investigations. Recruitment is based on merit and
equity requirements and any person who meets the
criteria may apply. The organisational culture is
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generally one of innovation, cooperation and
learning. 
The SCCU uses the same model as the DSO but
does not employ analysts. The latter functions are
performed by prosecutors. However, the SCCU has
dedicated on-site courts, which are serviced by the
co-located police and prosecutors. These courts
consequently sit much longer hours and are more
effective than the average court.
The DSO and the SCCU have been among the first
agencies to convict auditors and financial directors
for false reporting and asset stripping, and to
prosecute criminals for racketeering, corruption and
money laundering.  By 2007, the SCCU had
finalised 1 400 complex financial crime cases and
had an average conviction rate in excess of 94 per
cent. The DSO had finalised 1 500 cases, obtained
1 600 arrests and had an average conviction rate of
between 80-90 per cent. In addition, DSO
investigations led to the seizure of R5 billion in
contraband and, with the AFU, the civil forfeiture of
R1,5 billion, making it one of the major contributors
to the Criminal Asset Recovery Account. 
Benefits of these models 
The major benefits of the DSO and SCCU model for
criminal justice integration are outlined below:
• The early involvement of prosecutors means that 
cases with no prospect of success, owing to lack
of evidence or technical problems, are closed at
an earlier stage
• Cases are properly prepared and prosecuted
• Specialisation improves training and confidence 
among analysts, police and prosecutors
• Prosecutors can assist the police and they have 
ownership and accountability for cases (few
prosecutors will deal with one case through its
life cycle in other courts)
• Prosecutors have time for case preparation and 
consultations with victims (unlike in other units)
and develop relationships with clients, which in
turn improves information
• As organised and commercial crime and 
corruption cases are complex and often unique
in their characteristics, senior advocates and the
private sector (particularly the forensic
investigators) mentor younger prosecutors and
this has become part of the culture
• The proximity of police and prosecutors makes 
it quicker to investigate cases properly and
collective efforts are a recipe for success
witnessed by the high conviction rates attained
• Plea bargaining works very effectively in the 
DSO and SCCU model
• Criminals and experienced defence lawyers are 
met with equivalent skills
• The magistrates receive better quality cases 
when the SCCU members appear before them
• There are fewer logistical problems and it is less 
time consuming when the personnel are co-
located
• The presence of analysts, police and prosecutors 
and magistrates provides a check on the abuse
of power e.g. corruption
Transferring the DSO and the SCCU to the police
In May 2008, the General Law Amendment Bill of
2008 was introduced into parliament. It transfers
the functions and powers of the DSO to the South
African Police Service (SAPS). Detractors of the
DSO argue that the composition of the unit harms
prosecutorial integrity and that its activities have
breached the constitutional rights of the accused.
Furthermore, it stands accused of conducting illegal
intelligence operations and using unvetted private
security agencies and personnel. The National
Prosecuting Authority has denied all of these claims
and has outlined its case in affidavits before court.
The main issues of contention, however, appear to
be the location of the DSO and its proactive
investigative mandate.
The Bill locates the new Directorate for Priority
Crime Investigation (DPCI) squarely under the
control of the National Commissioner of Police,
which means that it will not have the functional
independence the DSO has enjoyed. It will rely on
referrals from the National Commissioner of Police,
who in turn has to be informed by the provincial
commissioners that an organised crime syndicate is
suspected to be operating in the province. The
layers of bureaucracy that must be transversed to
start an investigation are cumbersome and will
hinder decisive action against criminal groups, who
usually have the resources and sophistication to
counter law enforcement activity.
SA CRIME QUARTERLY No 24 • JUNE 2008 19WANNENBURG
The legislative mandate of the DPCI has some
specific clauses dealing with types of crimes to be
investigated and ‘omnibus clauses’ which attempt to
capture all forms of possible criminal activity within
its mandate. The mandate of the proposed DPCI has
been diluted because it will not be able to
proactively investigate cases as has been the case in
the DSO. The specific clauses suggest that the
mandate of the DPCI will be founded on an
arguably outdated definition of organised crime
because it largely confines its investigations to
traditional forms of the crime and those activities
conducted by ‘mafia-style’ structured organised
crime groups. The nature of organised crime is
evolving and traditionally structured organised crime
groups are relatively rare in South Africa. Now
criminals (like some multi-national companies)
outsource and privatise many of their essential
activities. Owing to the nature of organised and
financial crime and its symbiotic relationship with
corruption, combating strategies should include a
proactive attempt to anticipate, prevent and disrupt
criminal networks before they can commit or repeat
their crime. 
The wide powers to investigate enjoyed by the DSO
will be transferred to the National Commissioner of
Police and the DPCI functionaries. As the ‘omnibus’
clauses mandating the DPCI are broad and vague, it
is likely that criminals will contest the
constitutionality of the powers afforded to it,
delaying criminal trials. 
At the time of writing, it appears that the main
intention is to transfer the DSO and commercial
crime investigators to the DPCI.  The other nine
functional groups within the DSO, such as analysts,
will form part of Crime Intelligence or other
divisions. The transfer will disrupt the existing co-
located structures of both the DSO and the SCCU,
which can currently draw on a far wider range of
skills complementary to the investigation of crime.
The DPCI will have to rely on ad hoc intelligence
and analysis assistance from the Criminal
Intelligence Group within the SAPS, who have a
broader intelligence-gathering mandate.
In the DSO, for example, crime analysts play a vital
role in developing the strategy of the organisation
and delivering tactical products for investigation.
On projects, analysts obtain crime information, and
through sophisticated analysis software provide
profiles of criminal groups and investigation leads,
and make the information accessible for those
involved in the trial.  In the well-known Najwa
Petersen murder trial, police used analysts from
outside the service to conduct detailed cell phone
billings, which showed that Petersen had
telephoned the alleged killers before the murder. In
the DSO, on site analysts provide investigators with
ongoing support in understanding how the criminal
network operates and the details of the financial
transactions it carries out. 
Some prosecutors may be seconded to the DPCI but
will be confined to playing an investigative
function, while their colleagues in the National
Prosecution Service (NPS) will be requested to
prosecute the cases. If DSO prosecutors choose to
go to the SAPS, there may be less capacity within
the NPS to prosecute organised and financial crime
and corruption. If the prosecutor is only involved in
the case after the investigation is concluded, s/he
will not be familiar with the complexities of the
case and may not succeed in court against highly
skilled defence lawyers.
Drawing on the experience of the DSO, an
organisation that combines such a diversity of
persons and skills may take some time to develop
into a seamless and effective team, to learn how to
initiate, to develop project-based investigations and
to hone people skills. This will also be a challenge
in the police environment where extensive
restructuring has often stripped specialised units of
institutional memory, optimal numbers and
sufficiently skilled people. 
In addition DSO personnel earn more than police
officers. Thus, those DSO staff members going into
other SAPS divisions may face poor future prospects
because they will be given personal pay notches.
They could experience career stagnation until
police officers doing the same work catch up to
their salary levels. Similarly, the Police and Prisons
Officials Union has voiced its concern that its
members be treated equally to those moving to the
SAPS from other state departments.
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Many of the DSO members will have relatively
high ranks in the police. The SAPS seldom has large
numbers of similar ranked officials deployed in one
unit and the prospect of being transferred to other
units is high. High-ranking officers in the SAPS
seldom carry investigation dockets. Many DSO
members are passionate about investigation and
would prefer not to work in a largely managerial or
administrative capacity. In addition, at present there
is no clear career path for detectives. These issues
are of concern to many DSO members who may
consider finding alternative employment. The stated
intention of strengthening the fight against
organised and financial crime and corruption may
thus be thwarted.
Conclusion
At the time of writing, businessman Hugh Glenister
approached the High Court to interdict the
government from introducing legislation dissolving
the Scorpions. The High Court rejected the
application on the grounds that it does not have
jurisdiction to intervene in political processes.
However, it has given Glenister and opposition
parties leave to appeal to the Constitutional Court.
Public sentiment is divided on the issue of whether
the fight against crime will be improved with the
closure of the DSO. The matter may take much
longer to resolve than anticipated. However, if the
political will to fight organised and financial crime
and corruption exists, there may be a need to
consider alternative models that will improve on
both the DSO, the SCCU and SAPS initiatives and
take into account the Khampepe recommendations
with regards to the DSO. 
A ‘third way’ model that might be considered is that
of the Serious Organised Crime Agency in the
United Kingdom. SOCA is a non-departmental
public body that reports to an independent board.
The Board is appointed by the Home Secretary and
it ensures that the agency discharges its statutory
mandate and the priorities set by government. The
agency has four directorates, namely intelligence,
enforcement, intervention and corporate services.
The agency combines the skills of co-located
intelligence collectors, analysts, investigators and
prosecutors and support personnel.  Intelligence
collectors in SOCA are compelled to adhere to a
national intelligence model protocol, which is
applicable to other intelligence agencies in the UK.
The Serious Fraud Office has been incorporated
into SOCA and there are officials from relevant
agencies, like Customs and Excise and Revenue
Services, seconded to it. 
In South Africa, a unit modelled on SOCA with
personnel transferred or seconded from the
intelligence agencies, the Receiver of Revenue and
Customs and Excise, the DSO and the SAPS
Organised Crime Unit would provide a formidable
armoury in combating serious and complex
organised crime. Board members could be drawn
from government and civil society to ensure that
there is sufficient oversight of the new body.
Investigators could have a dual reporting line to the
Board and the Minister of Safety and Security. The
new ‘political champion’ and coordinating and
management structure envisaged for the criminal
justice system could play a role in managing the
daily interface between the proposed unit and the
criminal justice agencies. 
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Endnotes
1 The ‘untouchables’ refer to the courageous and 
incorruptible law enforcement agents who prosecuted
Mafi Don Al Capone during the prohibition era in the
United States. 
2 Gail writes in her personal capacity. She is a member of 
the DSO and has been a consultant for the South
African Institute for International Affairs project on
organised crime.
3 The SAPS Commercial Branch working in the SCCU 
reports to the police but is co-located with the
prosecutors from the National Prosecuting Service.
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